Event Title
Session 2
Location
Centre de formation et de séminaires (CEFOS) in Remich, Luxembourg
Start Date
6-7-2013 1:30 PM
Description
Session 2: “The Future of Public Financing”
- Michael Koß, “Slow Convergence or no Change at all? The development of West European Party Funding Regimes, 2002–2012”
- Ingrid van Biezen and Daniela R. Piccio, “Searching for Evidence of the Cartel: Are Public Funding Regimes Exclusionary?
Discussant: Iain McMenamim
ABSTRACTS
Slow Convergence or no Change at all? The development of West European Party Funding Regimes, 2002–2012Michael Koß, University of Munich, Germany
This paper reviews my earlier observation that we are witnessing a convergence of party funding regimes, which I assumed to be increasingly characterized by more regulation, (relatively) more state funding to political parties, and less large donations, especially from corporate donors. This convergence claim is at odds with the workshop’s basic assumption and hence in need of further elaboration. To provide such an elaborations, the paper aims to trace back the development of four West European party funding regimes over the last decade. Traditionally, these four regimes remarkably differed from each other: in Sweden, parties primarily drew their income from public sources), in Germany, income was generated both from private and public sources, in Britain, parties primarily drew their income from private sources, and, finally, in France, where neither private nor public sources played a significant role but parties rather relied on clandestine funding via corrupt exchanges. The paper argues that party funding regimes can be explained by three independent variables: the institutional context within which parties operate, their strategic goals, and the public discourse on political corruption. As the former two were (with the notable exception of Sweden, which will be discussed by the paper) stable over the last decade, emphasis will be put on analyzing the public discourse on party funding. This task will be carried out in a qualitative process tracing based on newspaper sources (each one conservative and one progressive quality newspaper per county) aiming to reveal the perception of dominant problems in party funding and reform initiatives. Against this background, the paper will assess whether a convergence of party funding regimes is observable. In doing so, the paper additionally takes into consideration functional equivalents for direct state funding to political parties such as ‘party taxes’ from MPs’ and office-holders’ salaries as well as public funding for party groups and foundations affiliated to political parties.
Searching for Evidence of the Cartel: Are Public Funding Regimes Exclusionary?
Ingrid van Biezen and Daniela R. Piccio, Leiden University, The Netherlands
The public funding of parties is usually justified on the grounds of its potential to promote fair competition, to level the playing field between party competitors, to insulate parties from the pressures of wealthy donors, and to enhance the political parties’ financial transparency. International governmental and non-governmental organizations tend to agree that states should financially support political parties because they provide an indispensible and fundamental contribution to the maintenance of a healthy and effective democracy. The impact of public funding on the democratic process, however, is not unequivocally positive. As the cartel thesis advanced by Katz and Mair (1995), points out, public subsidies are one of the key resources that established political parties can use in order to keep new and challenger parties from gaining access to political power.
Thus far, the search for corroboration of this aspect of the cartel thesis has tended to concentrate on examining the impact of public funding on various aspects of the party system. However, the effects of public subsidies on party competition and party fragmentation prove difficult to separate from other institutional and non-institutional factors, such as electoral rules or changes in public opinion. In this light, we argue that a more profitable strategy to search for evidence supporting the cartel argument consists of focusing on the actual regulations that comprise the different funding regimes, rather than on their intended and unintended consequences for the party system. Drawing on longitudinal data gathered for both Western and Eastern Europe, this paper focuses on the development of those legal rules which have the greatest potential to exclude new and smaller political parties from the political system, i.e. the eligibility threshold for public funding, the mechanisms for the allocation of public money, and the timing of reimbursement of election campaigns (before or after elections). Following the cartel party thesis we should expect the development of a party finance legislation to favour the established political elites and disadvantages the challengers.
Session 2
Centre de formation et de séminaires (CEFOS) in Remich, Luxembourg
Session 2: “The Future of Public Financing”
- Michael Koß, “Slow Convergence or no Change at all? The development of West European Party Funding Regimes, 2002–2012”
- Ingrid van Biezen and Daniela R. Piccio, “Searching for Evidence of the Cartel: Are Public Funding Regimes Exclusionary?
Discussant: Iain McMenamim
ABSTRACTS
Slow Convergence or no Change at all? The development of West European Party Funding Regimes, 2002–2012Michael Koß, University of Munich, Germany
This paper reviews my earlier observation that we are witnessing a convergence of party funding regimes, which I assumed to be increasingly characterized by more regulation, (relatively) more state funding to political parties, and less large donations, especially from corporate donors. This convergence claim is at odds with the workshop’s basic assumption and hence in need of further elaboration. To provide such an elaborations, the paper aims to trace back the development of four West European party funding regimes over the last decade. Traditionally, these four regimes remarkably differed from each other: in Sweden, parties primarily drew their income from public sources), in Germany, income was generated both from private and public sources, in Britain, parties primarily drew their income from private sources, and, finally, in France, where neither private nor public sources played a significant role but parties rather relied on clandestine funding via corrupt exchanges. The paper argues that party funding regimes can be explained by three independent variables: the institutional context within which parties operate, their strategic goals, and the public discourse on political corruption. As the former two were (with the notable exception of Sweden, which will be discussed by the paper) stable over the last decade, emphasis will be put on analyzing the public discourse on party funding. This task will be carried out in a qualitative process tracing based on newspaper sources (each one conservative and one progressive quality newspaper per county) aiming to reveal the perception of dominant problems in party funding and reform initiatives. Against this background, the paper will assess whether a convergence of party funding regimes is observable. In doing so, the paper additionally takes into consideration functional equivalents for direct state funding to political parties such as ‘party taxes’ from MPs’ and office-holders’ salaries as well as public funding for party groups and foundations affiliated to political parties.
Searching for Evidence of the Cartel: Are Public Funding Regimes Exclusionary?
Ingrid van Biezen and Daniela R. Piccio, Leiden University, The Netherlands
The public funding of parties is usually justified on the grounds of its potential to promote fair competition, to level the playing field between party competitors, to insulate parties from the pressures of wealthy donors, and to enhance the political parties’ financial transparency. International governmental and non-governmental organizations tend to agree that states should financially support political parties because they provide an indispensible and fundamental contribution to the maintenance of a healthy and effective democracy. The impact of public funding on the democratic process, however, is not unequivocally positive. As the cartel thesis advanced by Katz and Mair (1995), points out, public subsidies are one of the key resources that established political parties can use in order to keep new and challenger parties from gaining access to political power.
Thus far, the search for corroboration of this aspect of the cartel thesis has tended to concentrate on examining the impact of public funding on various aspects of the party system. However, the effects of public subsidies on party competition and party fragmentation prove difficult to separate from other institutional and non-institutional factors, such as electoral rules or changes in public opinion. In this light, we argue that a more profitable strategy to search for evidence supporting the cartel argument consists of focusing on the actual regulations that comprise the different funding regimes, rather than on their intended and unintended consequences for the party system. Drawing on longitudinal data gathered for both Western and Eastern Europe, this paper focuses on the development of those legal rules which have the greatest potential to exclude new and smaller political parties from the political system, i.e. the eligibility threshold for public funding, the mechanisms for the allocation of public money, and the timing of reimbursement of election campaigns (before or after elections). Following the cartel party thesis we should expect the development of a party finance legislation to favour the established political elites and disadvantages the challengers.