Political Science
The “Too Big to Fail” Dilemma and the United States Experience in Bank Resolution by the FDIC in the 2023 Systemic Crisis Episode
Document Type
Book Chapter
Abstract
This chapter addresses the “too big to fail” (TBTF) predicament, first by analyzing how the existence of large, systemic banks creates moral hazard and complicates resolution efforts. It evaluates the implications of various bank resolution strategies on overall financial stability. Concurrently, the analysis examines the U.S. experience resolving small bank failures, with a particular focus on the 2023 systemic crisis episode involving Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank. The discussion highlights the effectiveness of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) resolution mechanisms and identifies lessons applicable to enhancing future practices. © 2027 selection and editorial matter, Sebastián Royo, Ewa Miklaszewska, and Giovanni Ferri.
Publication Title
Bank Failure and Resolution in the EU: Lessons for the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance Framework
Publication Date
2026
First Page
29
Last Page
49
ISBN
9781040831342
DOI
10.4324/9781003729822-3
Keywords
bank failure, federal deposit insurance corporations, financial stability
Repository Citation
Royo, Sebastián, "The “Too Big to Fail” Dilemma and the United States Experience in Bank Resolution by the FDIC in the 2023 Systemic Crisis Episode" (2026). Political Science. 131.
https://commons.clarku.edu/faculty_political_science/131
