Economics
Predatory behavior of governments: The case of mass killing
Document Type
Article
Abstract
In this paper we seek to answer the question: why do governments engage in mass killing? Tullock (1974) gives gain or avoidance of loss as the motive. We construct a three-stage theoretic framework to explain the choice of a ruler of a country. The conditions that must be met for a mass killing regime to win over alternative regimes are derived. Using the COW project data over the period 1816-1997, we estimate two models: negative binomial regression of number of battle-related deaths and a probit model for the choice of mass killing. The paper concludes with suggestions for data collections and further research.
Publication Title
Defence and Peace Economics
Publication Date
4-2008
Volume
19
Issue
2
First Page
107
Last Page
125
ISSN
1024-2694
DOI
10.1080/10242690701516846
Keywords
mass killing, vertical differentiation
Repository Citation
Bae, Sang Hoo and Ott, Attiat F., "Predatory behavior of governments: The case of mass killing" (2008). Economics. 67.
https://commons.clarku.edu/faculty_economics/67