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Sweden's Floating Refugee Camp: A New Form of Spatial Segregation?

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Sweden's Floating Refugee Camp: A New Form of Spatial Segregation?

Miranda Weinstein

MAY 2016

A MASTER'S RESEARCH PAPER

**Submitted to the faculty of Clark University, Worcester,
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And accepted on the recommendation of

Anita Häusermann Fábos, Chief Instructor

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ABSTRACT

Sweden's Floating Refugee Camp: A New Form of Spatial Segregation?

Miranda Weinstein

This paper looks at the structure of discrimination and marginalization of refugees and asylum-seekers. The paper investigates a new form of housing — floatels — which was seen in Sweden in 2016. This paper explores the relevant literature on identity, biopower, and spatial segregation, to make the case that floatels are contemporary forms of encampment. Floatels are clear examples of the State's use of biopower to spatially segregate certain undesirable populations. By providing a case study of the situation in Sweden, the overall goal of the paper is to highlight the issues and complexity involved in refugee housing. In particular, it aims to discourage governments from using this form of housing by pointing out the limitations.

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DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate this paper to my parents. To my mother for instilling in me a love of learning and showing me what being a strong woman looks like; with big thanks, also to my father for supporting me through the internship that laid the foundation for this paper.

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1. Introduction

Discussions about Syrian refugees were not as present in global consciousness—certainly not nearly as routine as they have come to be—until the Fall of 2017 when member states of the European Union witnessed a large influx of Syrian citizens. Many EU states tightened policies and closed their borders, while some, most notably Sweden and Germany, welcomed Syrian refugees openly. The conflict in Syria began in 2011, but has undergone waves of internal instability and displacement since its onset. In the end of 2016, Amnesty International reported an internal displacement rate of over 8.7 million with an additional 4.8 million people displaced in neighboring Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt (Amnesty International 2016b). Despite the high displacement rates (internally and externally), there had been a general lack of acceptance to the extent of conflict and unsafety until the Syrian refugee crisis began staring at them blatantly in the face.

Social media posts depicting children drowning while seeking safety in Greece, evoked feelings of empathy, sorrow, and embarrassment. The media made this crisis harder to ignore. People urged the international community to respond to this widespread “humanitarian disaster” occurring on European soil. The increased desire to respond was showcased in different ways. Some people went to the train stations where refugees were arriving. Others flew to Greece and assisted in the documentation and reception of refugees and asylum-seekers. Many donated to humanitarian relief

agencies, most notable UNHCR and MSF. Despite this general desire to respond and protect refugees, discrimination and marginalization of refugees continues to happen in ways that are not at the forefront of people's discussions, or social media posts. Beginning in the early 2010s, European Union member states have enacted certain policies that subtly allow for discrimination against refugees and asylum-seekers, usually through a national security lens.

This paper will attempt to highlight and bring certain forms of marginalization strategies to the forefront of international advocacy. It will specifically look at how housing policies have allowed for forms of discrimination through categorization of refugees and asylum-seekers. In order to provide a concrete understanding of how states employ alternative forms of encampment, the paper will provide a case study seen in contemporary Sweden between 2015 and 2016. It will investigate the theories of identity politics, biopolitics, and encampment, to discuss how contemporary forms of encampments that have been allowed to exist through state-sponsored marginalization tactics through privatizing basic commodities. These theories will highlight how the state can perceive refugees as non-humans thereby allowing encampment to persist. By dehumanizing these individuals, states are given authority to marginalize certain groups through their housing policies, dictating what parts of the city/country individuals have access to. It is these housing policies and the location of accommodation types that I argue are the contemporary forms of encampment.

Labeling and classifying someone as a refugee allows for other forms of discrimination to exist. By identifying someone as a refugee, that individual is put into an “other” category, where forms of biopolitics and biopower are employed (which this paper will address below). These bureaucratic classifications create visible differences between those citizens that have rights, and refugees who do not hold those rights. James Scott asserted that “legibility is a condition of manipulation” (Scott 1998, 183). Using this classification, the state can manipulate and discriminate against refugees through legibility in a variety of ways. When constructed through a national security discourse, states tend to have more flexibility in the policies they enact. It is through this discourse that many discrimination and marginalization policies come to life.

By looking at contemporary forms of encampment through housing policies for asylum-seekers and refugees in the West, I am hopeful that additional research and information can be collected to discuss how the creation of binaries (and categories) perpetuates discrimination against certain people, especially refugees. One of the paper’s larger goals is to demonstrate that the shift to urban refugees has not halted the presence of camps. These camps are merely constructed in different forms and have become invisible to the common eye. UNHCR states that 10% of Syrian refugees are housed in camps (UNHCR 2017). However, this paper argues that this percentage is actually greater due to many of the policies Western States have enacted to house refugees. In addressing these forms of encampments, this paper will look at “non-

traditional” housing in the West. It will also look at a relatively new phenomenon of housing—“floatels”—or floating accommodation centers (Pardo and Fernandez 2012).

The concept of housing refugees on floatels is not a new phenomenon unique to Sweden. In 2002, an article came out that the United Kingdom was going to “house hundreds of asylum-seekers on a floating hotel, complete with several bars, a restaurant and a TV in every cabin” (Fitzmaurice 2002). The Government of British Columbia was also contemplating opening a cruise ship to house refugees during their 2-week integration orientation (Woo, Hunter and Bula 2015). There is also the lesser-known Flotel Europa that was docked in Copenhagen and housed refugees from Bosnia during the 1990s¹ (Duelund, Mortensen and Varming 1994). In Denmark, these floatels housed 850 people. In a brief article, the political leader of Denmark’s Center Party was interviewed saying that it was good that the ship was in the center of Copenhagen rather than in the country, as it made easier to get to the market and shops to find cheaper food. However, even in the article from the 1990s, this politician remarks that the biggest refugee problem is still the long wait times to get refugee status. This interview illustrates that the floating accommodations are not a completely new approach to housing. Yet, in Denmark, this approach to floatels was in a large city, and not the small towns, as was proposed in Sweden. Furthermore, one refugee woman commented on

¹ At this time, limited information could be found in regard to Flotel Europa, other than a documentary that had been made from one of the residents. This lack of information, however, only strengthens the argument that additional research needs to be made in regard to this form of housing and encampment.

how it was not until she left the Danish floatel that she was able to learn the language and live outside the camp (Hadžibulić and Manić 2016, 109).

As mentioned above, this paper will present a case study in Sweden to show the presence of a new form of housing and accommodation technique. There were two main reasons for this choice. The first reason is due to the gap in the literature. The majority of the existing literature looks at encampment and the presence of camps within the Global South. There is a large void in the literature on invisible forms of camps in Western States. By shifting the focus to housing in the “West,”² this paper aims to unpack how identity politics, the discourse on national security, and encampment policies are intertwined. By using Sweden as the case study, we can begin to understand how states that are human rights-oriented states, and socially progressive welfare states, still have limitations on who they want to help. The ways in which Western states apply certain types of population management tools, through their housing policies, needs to be highly scrutinized going forward.

² For the purpose of this paper the “West” defines Australia, Canada, Western Europe, and the United States. Discussions as to the discourse on the “west/rest” are outside of the scope of the paper. It is important to note that the application of the term “the West” is not used to perpetuate power and knowledge over “the rest” or to further perpetuate the idea that the “rest” of the world is less developed, and therefore in need of developing. The labels of West/Rest, Developed/Developing, North/South are inherently constructed and colonized to mean a certain type of knowledge is powerful, and therefore, a certain way of life is “correct.” When using the terms throughout the paper, I attempt to describe geographical regions, and not regions of culture or knowledge. However, the dominance of language and culture is still inherent within this paper as it analyzes the West’s subjugation of other people’s knowledge and culture through refugee housing.

The second reason this paper will investigate Sweden, and Western states at large, is because of my own positionality within the discourse. Being born and raised in Sweden, I speak Swedish fluently, and understand the social aspects and perspectives from the state. Furthermore, during the Summer of 2016, I interned at UNHCR's Regional Representation for Northern Europe's office in Stockholm, Sweden. During my internship, I worked in the Communications Department and analyzed media trends in the Swedish speaking newspapers in Sweden and Finland. Throughout this internship, I kept seeing new articles about one particular form of accommodation, Ocean Gala. When I would speak to my colleagues, no one else saw or perceived this form of housing in the same way as I did. It was this story that has since become the body of my paper. I had been perceiving Ocean Gala as the perfect way in which invisible discrimination, biopower, and bare life all contributed to allow for this housing policy to be enacted without advice from the Swedish community, or the international community. While the concept of the paper originated from my time and media analysis of news coverage in Sweden, it in no way reflects the opinions of UNHCR.

In 2015, The Swedish Migration Agency signed a contract acquiring Ocean Gala through Floating Accommodations Sweden. This contract rendered the services of Ocean Gala, a cruise ship, to be relocated to a port in Sweden to house refugees and asylum-seekers. The migration agency justified investing in this type of housing by citing the housing shortage the country was, and is, experiencing.

Sweden has been one of the biggest receivers of refugees in Europe. Sweden and Germany account for housing and hosting 64% of the 884,461 Syrian refugees in Europe (April 2011- October 2016) (UNHCR 2017). During the summer of 2016, Ocean Gala was instructed to dock at the port of Utansjö, outside of Härnösand, in northern Sweden. It was set to house up to 1,790 refugees. Given the number of refugees that had made their way to Sweden, the Swedish authorities anticipated a steady stream of refugees and asylum-seekers would continue to come into the country (Svensson, O. 2016).

While Ocean Gala never actually housed any refugees,³ the concept of housing refugees on a floatel, even if it is docked on a port, goes against the third durable solution, the need to integrate. The Geneva Convention requires that the international community accept refugees on basis of humanitarian grounds. However, the Convention does not specify the exact conditions at which refugees need to be housed. While the Swedish Migration Agency, a government agency, went into the contract stating that there was a housing shortage, this paper will provide justification that this form of housing is a new spatialized form of camp. As I shall show, the authorities were attempting to further marginalize and encamp the refugees and asylum-seekers. Housing individuals on a ship creates a deliberate physical separation between the

³ The exact politics and timeline of event of Ocean Gala are outside of the scope of this paper.

refugees and asylum-seekers with the rest of society. It allows for biopolitics and biopower to be imposed onto the refugees and asylum-seekers.

In October 2015, a shift occurred within the public discussions of the refugee and forced migration situation in Sweden. Prior to October 2015, the government had been classifying the refugee challenge as a “refugee situation.” However, beginning in October, the government and media began reporting it as a “refugee crisis,” a phrase that implies an inherent state securitization (Hansson MalmLöf 2016, 29). Since October 2015, most statements have been categorized through a national security framework (Hansson MalmLöf 2016, 25-26). The country has also enacted policies that tightened both the border controls and access to residence permits. This was largely due to the increased terror attacks on European soil, as well as the general inability to adequately respond to the needs and safety of asylum-seekers and refugees.

Due to the complex situation, various alternative forms of housing had to be investigated. The presence of the national security discourse provided a space for panic. This panic provided justification for the state to investigate floatels as a form of housing. It has been well-documented that certain marginalized groups throughout society are red-lined and excluded from certain types of housing/spaces. This paper brings together the literature on past marginalization through housing policies, identity, and the political control, to argue that not only are refugees being marginalized and excluded, but that floatels as a form of housing are not adequate for living.

Fundamentally, these policies must be viewed as contemporary forms of camps and encampment.

I do not attempt to argue that Sweden has not experienced a housing shortage. Furthermore, I do not attempt to argue that Sweden has not experienced a ‘drain’ on all aspects of society given the number of asylum-seekers from Syria they are hosting, in addition to refugees from other countries. I acknowledge that these aspects are true. However, this paper shows how the lack of housing and the strain of the state has provided a space for this form of housing and accommodation technique to be investigated. It is ultimately my larger goal to highlight how floatels are counterintuitive to improve and accepting refugees within society as normal humans and citizens. The floatels are not just camps for the refugees, but they are also camps for the Swedish people.

Another larger fundamental reason for including the floatel approach within this framework is to highlight the reoccurrence of state-sponsored private accommodations. It is through this privatization that additional marginalization occurs, as it is easy to no longer become part of the state’s responsibly and abide by the same set of standards. This particular housing form, and the paper at large, attempts to address the power dynamics within the floatel approach and to bring attention this form of marginalization before this accommodation format is investigated further.

Prior to getting to the body of the paper, some basic definitions and concepts must be explained. Biopolitics and biopower are concepts originally coined by Michel Foucault. “Biopower” describes the use of power from the state imposed upon people due to their biological characteristics. The hegemonic power is able to regulate and control individuals through “the biopolitics of the population” (Foucault 1990, 139). Giorgio Agamben describes Foucault’s biopower as “the growing inclusion of man's natural life in the mechanisms and calculations of power” (Agamben 1998, 119). By determining which bodies are valuable, one can determine how they will live their life, and how to control populations. This concept is important because it describes how states (in general) have power over enacting policies and can decide who has access to what. Furthermore, it is through the dominant categories of society that these individuals have come to dominate/control others who do not fit into this perception of dominance, i.e. race, class, body, gender, sexual orientation, etc. The concepts of both biopower and biopolitics are visible in Ocean Gala, as well as other concepts of identity politics, categorization, and theories of encampment and spatial exclusion.

“Biopolitics” is the use of biopower from the state towards an individual. Biopolitics represents “techniques of power present at every level of the social body and utilized ...[within] institutions” (Foucault 1990, 141). Capitalism is inherent in the construction of biopower. The capitalist society is therefore an important factor to consider when discussing biopolitics and biopower, as justification for who is

considered important, and analysis is needed of who needs to be protected from the rest of society. Foucault also states that these techniques of power have dictated which groups first benefit from the hegemonic structure through cementing a dominant “social hierachization,” within society (Foucault 1990, 141). The state allows for discrimination to occur through the structure created and enforced. The state and sovereignty are inherently biopolitical; there is no way to separate the two (Hannah in Lee 2010, 59-61). Stepping outside the law also allows for these marginalization practices to occur, but as the individuals are seen as inferior, the state can control their bodies and their placement.

Building off the concepts of biopolitics and biopower, Giorgio Agamben introduces the concept of bare life. Bare life is when individuals are depoliticized without official status in order to allow for certain rights and policies to be exerted onto them (Agamben in Lee 2010, 57). Refugees are typically reduced to bare life within camps. The concept of bare life is highly associated with a form of exploitation and victimization, as fundamentally, it means having no agency to express *any* rights.

The term “refugee” can be interpreted as a policy-oriented term, or a general category. Officially a refugee is defined through the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee, where a refugee is someone,

“owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is

unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (Article 1, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees).

The 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees later removed the temporal and geographic boundaries originally set by the 1951 Convention. A refugee must seek official refugee status, which leads to the policy-oriented connotation. Certain groups might not want to identify someone as a refugee until their status has been determined. For the remainder of this paper *refugee* (*italicized*) implies the policy-oriented association of the word, whereas “refugee” (not italicized) is used to describe anyone who has crossed an international border for fear of persecution due to the identity traits listed above. There is an inherent classification and marginalization already present in the discourse as to who can be a *refugee*.⁴

“Asylum-seeker” is a term used to describe someone who is in the process of having their refugee status determined, i.e. someone who is seeking asylum. There is less of a political connotation associated with this word and it is also used throughout this paper. The right to seek asylum is enshrined within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a legally binding treaty, it does signify that the safe reception of an individual seeking

⁴ See Koizumi and Hoffstaedter (2015) for multiple stories of people who have been left outside of the classification of “refugee” for a better understanding of the limitations of the *refugee* definition. See Kagan (2007) for an understanding of the different applications of refugee within the Global North and Global South.

asylum should be guaranteed by all nation states, regardless of the race, ethnicity, etc. of the asylum-seeker.

“Non-refoulement,” the basis of the refugee regime, could be translated as the right to a residence (Møller 2015, 79). However, there is no clear explanation of what a residence entails. A lack of a formal definition (which has its own limitations as it constructs exclusions) provides for unequal interpretation and application of this right. The lack of a formal understanding of “residence” has allowed and will continue to allow for this human rights abuse to occur. There is also a lack of research expressly linking some of these housing/residence policies to contemporary forms of encampment, something this paper sets out to do.

For the purpose of this paper, encampment signifies the verb and action of being confined into a camp-like place. It is the process of setting up a camp. *Encampment* also addresses the structure and policies that have allowed for certain individuals to live in a temporary camp-like structure.

Despite being positioned in places that may be outside the political order, refugees and asylum-seekers do still have political power and agency. When using various terminology to discuss the marginalization and victimization of refugees through accommodation forms and housing policies, I do not seek to further perpetuate

the perspective that refugees and asylum-seekers lack agency.⁵ Rather, this analysis focuses on the state, and their ulterior motives for housing refugees and asylum-seekers in territorial spaces of exception.

The simplest way to understand how the politics of refugee-ness has become biological and reduced to bare life is through media's communication of advertisement. Refugees are often revictimized and dehumanized due to their bare humanity and presence (Malkki 1996, 386-390). Cynthia Enloe has categorized a "womanandchild" phenomenon which speaks to the perpetual victimization and categorization certain refugees faces (Enloe in Kahn and Fábos 2017, 2). Furthermore, refugees often become the faces of ad campaigns without necessarily consenting or knowing what is going on (Kahn and Fábos 2017, 7). Refugees are further sub-classified, a process that creates a "hierarchy of misery" and clear categorizations of vulnerabilities (Agier 2010, 39).⁶ The media has influenced people's perceptions of refugees as suspicious, where the perceptions of refugees as migrants is detrimental to development of greater society (Kjærørum 2002).

⁵ For further analysis of critiques of Agamben's theories, see Brun, Fábos and El-Abed (2017), Isin and Rygiel (2007), Owens (2009), Lemke (2013) and Sigona (2015).

⁶ In some ways, being classified a *refugee* gives more agency and power to an individual than someone who does not carry that policy distinction (Loescher and Milner 2005, 32). When it comes to humanitarian aid, refugees tend to receive more assistance, their education is prioritized, and their security is ensured, among other aspects (Loescher and Milner 2005, 32). This level of assistance is not always given to other populations of concern. An in-depth analysis of these hierarchical classifications is outside the scope of the paper.

This paper will be divided into seven sections. The first section is this introduction. The second section will provide an understanding of the political and refugee climate in Sweden. The third section will address the literature. It will provide an analysis of the theoretical understandings of encampment, identity, and marginalization. It will consider the current refugee discourse in order to showcase how states have created a non-human category, comprising refugees for the purpose of this paper. The fourth section discusses camps. It will address the camp structure, and the shift of asylum-oriented assistance to containment. An analysis of floatels will be present within this section. A brief case study of Island encampment will also be provided in order to strengthen the argument that a floatel is a spatially segregated housing accommodation. The sixth section will link provide a space to explain how floatels are contemporary forms of camps. The hope is that this understanding can be expanded upon to other Western states. The seventh, and final, section is the paper's conclusion. While the paper focuses on the marginalization of refugees, there are other social groups within societies (i.e. ethnic, racial, gender, non-abled bodied, religious, etc.) that face similar state-sponsored marginalization and discriminatory policies. The ultimate goal of the paper is to argue that floatels are spatially segregated forms of camps, and that this form of housing accommodation, needs to be stopped before it is implemented elsewhere.

2. Sweden's approach to Refugees

Located in Northern Europe, the Kingdom of Sweden is home to 10 million inhabitants (2017). The largest city is Stockholm, the capital, which is home to 2,123,300 residents. Göteborg and Malmö are the second and third most populous cities inhabiting 928,600 and 656,400 individuals, respectively (Sweden.se 2015). Eighty-five percent of the population of Sweden lives on just 1.3% of the total land (2010) (Statistics Sweden 2012, 20). Twenty-three percent of the population is below the age of 20, and seventeen percent were born in another country (Sweden.se 2015). There is a current a current life expectancy at birth of 80.4 years of age (2014) (OECD 2016). The country has an unemployment rate of 7.4% of the labor force (2015) (OECD 2016). In addition to the Swedish state, the Sami people are the indigenous and nomadic population of Sweden. The Sami people have their own Nation, Parliament, language, culture, etc. and tend to occupy the Northern regions of Sweden, along with Norway, Finland and Russia. In 2000, the Sami language became an officially recognized minority language in Sweden (Sweden.se 2017).⁷ Additionally, Sweden has a GINI coefficient of 0.28, showing a relatively high rate of income equality between different social groups within the country (the US has 0.394 in comparison) (OECD 2016).

The Swedish Migration Agency is the government agency that deals with all asylum claims and applications within Sweden. In 2014, there were 81,301 asylum-seekers in Sweden. By 2015, the number had more than doubled to 162,877 (Swedish

⁷ Finnish, Yiddish, Romani, Meänkieli (Thorne Valley Finnish) and Sami are the five officially recognized minority languages in Sweden.

Migration Agency 2017).⁸ In 2016, the number dropped significantly (to 28,939) after the country had tightened border controls and tightened family reunification policies. During the 2015 European refugee migration, 35,000 asylum-seekers arrived as “unaccompanied minors” in Sweden (Sweden.se 2016). Unaccompanied minors require additional assistance, and are placed in different types of housing.⁹¹⁰ At the beginning of 2016, there was an average wait time of 8.4 months for decisions on asylum applications. However, the number is expected to rise to approximately 12 months in 2017, given the amount of applications currently being reviewed by the Migration Agency (Sweden.se 2016). During the initial days and weeks where Sweden witnessed a mass influx of Syrian refugees, the Migration Agency was having difficulty accommodating the number of people that had arrived in Sweden. At one point, many asylum-seekers were forced to sleep in tents until a better housing solution was proposed (Sweden.se 2016).

The Swedish Migration Agency, or separate private actor, must provide an accommodation setting for asylum-seekers. Furthermore, as the sole organization deciding the claims of these asylum-seekers, the Swedish Migration Agency decides which individual’s cases will be looked at first. Exercising this power is a process of

⁸ This is more than double the amount of refugees Sweden housed during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

⁹ In Sweden, unaccompanied minors have been housed separated in places known as *HVB hem- hem för vård eller boende* (residential care homes for children and young persons).

¹⁰ Unless Ocean Gala would be designated as an HVB home, it would most likely not house unaccompanied minors.

biopower by dictating which people are valuable, but also deciding the demographic makeup of Utansjö and Härnösand through determining which refugees are housed on the floatel. Often, women and children are given priority, as they are seen as most “vulnerable.” Unaccompanied minors are addressed by themselves with high priority, especially given the high unaccompanied minor rates in general, and the recent accusations of unaccompanied minors being forced into the sex industry in Göteborg (Svensson, F. 2016).

Swedish municipalities are also required by law to provide accommodations for individuals who have been “granted a residence permit for refugee or refugee-like reasons” (Sweden.se 2016). The Swedish central government is the responsible agent for financing the reception centers and systems within the local municipalities (Valenta and Bunar 2010, 473). Municipal authorities also receive certain subsidies from the central government to help host refugees during their two-year integration period (Valenta and Bunar 2010, 474). In the end of 2013, Swedish Migration Agency opened up their permit process to citizens of Syria who already held temporary residence permits in Sweden. The Swedish Migration Agency announced that anyone who was a Syrian citizen, or was stateless but had resided in Syria, could apply to become a permanent resident of Sweden (Hansson Malmöf 2016, 25-26). During the beginning of 2016, residency permit requirements were tightened. There is also a work permit requirement, which can make it difficult for asylum-seekers to work during this period (Sweden.se 2016). In order to work, asylum-seekers in Sweden need a work permit in


addition to the residency permit, adding another barrier to their integration into Swedish life.

Sweden is often lauded for its commitment to refugees, being one of the ten relocation countries, and one of the top ten Western countries to host refugees relative to their population size. However, there are a number of challenges associated with Sweden's high refugee intake that are often overlooked. Similar to many other Western countries, Sweden has seen an increase in right-wing movements, including Neo-Nazi groups such as the Soldiers of Oden. The Swedish Democrats, a political party rooted in white supremacy has some, albeit limited, seats in Parliament.

Hansson Malmöf includes a graph in her article that shows that the level of concern in Sweden over migration. While, historically, a low level of concern over migration was seen throughout the entire country, a drastic spike occurred in 2015 and 2016 that coincided with the influx of Syrian refugees (Hansson Malmöf 2016, 27).¹¹

¹¹ It is important to note that migration and refugee displacement are not the same, despite being associated within the same concepts. This study used the words migration to see how the Swedish populations were responding to migration in general.

Graph 1- Most Important Issue facing Sweden, 2005-2016



Source: Hansson Malmöf 2016, 27. Original Source: Eurobarometer, 2016

This graph shows that Swedes have become increasingly concerned with refugees entering the country. As Sweden.se states, “Sweden’s self-image as open and tolerant is challenged as asylum applications pile up, housing becomes scarcer and xenophobia more visible” (Sweden.se 2016). This statement illustrates how the theories and concepts discussed at length below are relevant to the contemporary situation in Sweden (between 2015-2016).

In an interview with The Local Voices, Minister for Employment Ylva Johansson stated, “This unprecedented population increase has resulted in a lack of practical resources, from housing to schools to healthcare. And that’s why we can’t continue having such a large number of people coming here year after year – it’s stretching our system” (quoted in Sweden.se 2016). Sweden.se continues to state that “Sweden has welcomed more refugees than any other European country in relation to

its population – and it has taken its toll on parts of society” (Sweden.se 2016). The numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers have generated a degree of tension between the refugees and people of Sweden. This tension creates further housing and accommodation concerns (in addition to the overall lack of space).

Given this existing tension, there are more hate crimes towards refugees in Sweden than in any other Nordic country. When analyzing media trends, it is evident that the incident reports of attacks towards asylum-seekers have increased drastically.¹² Some of these reports have included fires and arson attacks at known accommodation centers.¹³ Others reports include murder. Furthermore, in August 2016 a record number of asylum-seekers withdrew their application for asylum in Sweden. This withdrawal created another shock for Sweden, which had just begun to improve its capacity to deal with the large number of refugees and asylum-seekers. It is impossible to state the exact cause of these withdrawals, but some speculate that it could be a result of the tightening of family reunification policies, security issues throughout the country, or improved security in the home countries. It could also be a result of the general fatigue seen in Sweden and the overall feeling of not being wanted or welcome.

In August 2016, the Swedish Migration Agency decided to pull out from constructing new houses and apartments that were aimed at providing space for asylum-

¹² These security reports are what originally inspired this author to create this paper looking into security, encampment, and the ramifications of housing people on cruise ships.

¹³ Some housing accommodation centers are kept “secret” in order to protect the refugees given the recent crimes towards them.

seekers and refugees to accommodate for the housing shortage. The Swedish Migration Agency stated that they stopped the construction because the number of applications that were withdrawn were so drastic. The Government had recently implemented tighter family reunification policies, tightening admission into the country, making the rate of future claims a manageable number. However, the housing shortage still has not been solved and the conflict in Syria is still ongoing. Ocean Gala never housed people but it seems as though nothing has changed within the housing debate. Hopefully, by highlighting how these temporary houses are forms of encampment, the Swedish Migration Agency will once again investigate building houses for the future to avoid another housing shortage and crisis. The Swedish Migration Agency should refuse to house people on floatels in the future, and needs to investigate *permanent* accommodation forms in order to be able to respond to any future demand and not be forced into a panic again.

3. Displacement/emplacement- a sense of belonging

Michel Foucault states that “power is everywhere,” and power relations are in all aspects of our life (Daldal 2014, 149). One of Foucault’s larger themes is the examination of how an individual becomes a subject through power relations. He introduces the concept of “dividing practices” where man is objectified into one of two categories, i.e. the man and the sane (Daldal 2014, 161). Divided practice creates a binary classification for man, and at the same time marginalizes man. This distinction of

what is and what is not is what creates the ability to marginalize within society. This marginalization occurs not only at the state level, but also on the personal, individual level, within society. Examples include: citizen/non-citizen, man/woman, tall/short, white/non-white, etc. There has been a push-back to (some of) these classifications, i.e. that man/woman is exclusionary to other genders. The response has been to create additional categories, rather than to get rid of the process of categorization. The reason is because categories are largely needed to marginalize individuals that belong to the social groups that do not identify with the dominant group. This social hierarchy is what allows for the dominant group to stay in power, i.e. the creation of the man/other. It is important to keep categorization and classification in mind when thinking about refugees and their position within society, as refugees occupy the inferior category.¹⁴

Liisa Malkki is one of the foregrounding anthropological researchers on refugees, securitization, identity politics, and the role of the state. She states, “[t]he very notion of displacement implies emplacement, a “proper place” of belonging, and this place has long been assumed to be a home in a territorial, sovereign nation-state” (Malkki 2002, 353). This creates a hierarchy between those deemed valuable due to a proper place of belonging, and those who are displaced and “othered.” This aligns with Foucault’s concept of divided practices. If you are not emplaced, you must be displaced.

¹⁴ This is a generalization and does not get at the complexity and tension within the refugee discourse. It also does not address when refugees are able to use their own agency to make the change they want to make

Malkki's critiques of the larger structure is important when highlighting the specifics of marginalization through housing in the West. While those forced to flee due to conflict tend to originate from the Global South, the West/Northern countries are the ones who have structured the system, and have allowed for these views to be invisible, and for emplacement to be incorporated into the system. Critiquing the bigger issue shows how the West attempts to invisibly discriminate against refugees within their territories. It also allows for the incorporation of the Global North's perspective on belonging and citizenship to become cemented into the refugee structure. Therefore, these feelings of belonging, or lack of belong, are incorporated in all parts of society, regardless of geographic location.

The ability to make someone less than human is often seen during times of conflict, with a visible example being ethnic cleansing. Hannah Arendt portrays how identity, marginalization, and national security were intertwined during the Holocaust. The ability to revoke the citizenship of the German Jews voided their social identity. The result was "Jews became[ing] unrecognizable as fellow humans" making it easy to put them in camps and exterminate. Arendt claims that due to the connection between politics and social groups, it is the lack of these rights as citizens and humans that made it possible for the Jews to be stripped of all their rights (Arendt in Somers 2008, 7). Somers continues to point out that membership is required for citizenship, and citizenship is a prerequisite for human rights. Therefore, both membership and

citizenship are what make us human (Somers 2008, 7). While refugees and asylum-seekers are citizens of the world, they are not citizens of the state they are physically in. Therefore, they do not contain the essential membership for inclusion. It is specifically this lack of inclusion that this paper references when discussing the marginalization of refugees. The lack of membership within the “normal” category, and the constant classification of “other” allows for an exclusionary, discriminatory treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers throughout the world, especially in regard to housing and access to safe accommodations in host countries.

Refugees must be identifiable. They are either refugees or are not (i.e. divided practice). While not a simple task, setting out a clear definition of who is and who is not a refugee provides a structure and simplicity to the need to describe and make legible the person’s status. Through this process of legibility, states can manipulate their interpretation of who may or may not be a *refugee* (this dichotomy was alluded to on pages 11-12 when providing a definition of refugee and the policy-oriented connotation). Some common examples of the ways in which states can manipulate the categorization of *refugee* include: 1) the U.S.’s perspective on people fleeing the violence and persecution in Central America not being classified as *refugees* or 2) the discourse on “climate change refugees” versus climate change displacement. The basic creation of laws and policies allows for manipulation of these concepts and categorizations. The basic formulation of the category of refugee allows for the state to

manipulate who can and cannot be a refugee, as well as what services a refugee can access.

Identity, and how it is shaped, is a fascinating concept. Nationality and ethnicity are constructed after someone has been removed from society and need to create identity categories to fit into the new society. The concept of nationalism and ethnicity are functions of the powerful dominate group within society. Identity is a social construct. It is something that is formulated and constructed due to the people and context in which you find yourself in. It is not until you are outside of this context, that certain aspects of one's identity changes. These aspects are sometimes reinforced within one's self-categorization and self-identification. Identities are interesting in how they emerge from divided practices, you either are something, or you have to become something else. Identity can shift in ways that national boundaries and borders cannot. What is important, however, is how these boundaries are policed. It is this friction that leads to marginalization.

Gaim Kibreab clearly highlights the intersection between security, marginalization, and classification. He states,

“There is an excessive tendency on the part of host governments to label the presence of refugees, including immigrants, in their territories a security threat. The single most important reason why governments place refugee issues on the security agenda is to excuse even the most unjustifiable or draconian measures they take against them” (Kibreab 2007, 31).

This concept is portrayed by Loescher and Milner, who highlight how refugees that are perceived as “one of us” are received enthusiastically within the society. In contrast, refugees who are seen as part of “out-groups” are likely to be received in a more hostile environment (Loescher and Milner 2005, 32-34). The process of identifying someone as a refugee makes certain groups hyper-visible, but other groups hyper-invisible. This once again links back to the dichotomy between refugee and *refugee*. Refugees tend to be viewed as temporary guests, with a desire for refugees to return “home” upon safety, one of the three durable solutions (Fábos and Kibreab 2007, 3). Furthermore, through the structure of the refugee regime, an additional issue has been created, the Protracted Refugee Situations (Loescher and Milner 2005). Protracted Refugee Situations are clear examples of how embedded the issue of forced displacement is within society. Protracted Refugees embody the fact that a *durable solution* is non-existent.

Assigning someone the category of refugee/asylum-seeker not only assigns an identity to a human being at the whim of the state, but it also allows for the state to create a space for biopower to be used (read: *abused*). Here the abuse of power occurs through the intended discrimination of a particular social group. When states provide a national security threat to back-up this claim, governments are given additional leeway for certain actions. Often those practices are seen through events such as torture, or

invasion. But in this instance, it is through the encampment-like spaces of housing accommodations.

Refugees are categorized as living within “states of exception,” as they are neither citizens nor non-citizens. Kristen McConnachie states, “[i]f camps are typically presented as exceptional sites which are outside the realm of normal experience, those who live in camps are similarly pathologized, no longer recognized as individuals but as a collective ‘refugee’” (McConnachie 2014, 8). Due to this status within society, they are often subject to state sponsored/private sponsored discriminatory practices.

Simon Turner states that refugee camps are “exceptional space[s], at once inside and outside the law, and the refugees are reduced to bare life, outside the polis of national citizens” (quoted in Møller 2015, 88; Simon was referring to a Tanzanian camp). For Agamben the denigration of refugees is clear in their removal from society; refugees are housed in camps and disassociated from the politics of the humanitarian realm (Møller 2015, 72-128). Refugees have been made into victims in need of saving, living both within and outside of the law (Møller 2015, 72-128). Camps are spaces where its inhabitants are “stripped of political rights and reduced to a biological minimum, a state of ‘suspended life and suspended death’” (quoted in Lee 2010, 60). The structure of the humanitarian refugee regime has deprived refugees of their agency and identity. They are vulnerable to being classified as an “other” (Møller 2015, 89).

Refugees are encamped by states as a way to “quarantine” and contain them from the rest of the population. One Kurdish refugee in the Netherlands stated, “the policy of the government is one of segregation,” where certain housing policies are introduced to physically segregate refugees from the rest of the population. States tend to house refugees in lower-income areas where the cost of supports is not as heavy of a financial burden on the state (and taxpayers) as it may be in other places. These lower-income areas tend to be the same places where public housing is available (Mestheneos and Ioannidi 2002, 56). This (strategic) placement is a form of encampment. It reduces the ability to integrate and become a member of the larger community as access to resources tend to be harder to find in these areas. Not only does this marginalize and exclude refugees from certain people and places, but it excludes part of society from refugees, their knowledge and their culture.

Roger Zetter’s interviews with refugee populations in Cyprus, mostly from the African continent, are relevant to today’s discussions about the classification and labeling of refugees, despite being published in 1991. Speaking to Scott’s perspective on legibility and marginalization (discussed above), Roger Zetter claims that “labels pervade both social and development policy discourse” (Zetter 1991, 44). He highlights how the bureaucratic process of labeling someone a refugee perpetuates a “disaggregated model of identity” and provides a space for clear distinction and discrimination to occur between those who are refugees and those who are not. In

labeling someone a refugee, Zetter says “an identity is formed, transformed and manipulated within the context of public policy and especially, bureaucratic practices” (Zetter 1991, 39). The participants in his study stated that they felt the housing provided to them perpetuated the image and symbol of being a refugee (Zetter 1991, 39-62). For these refugees, the location of their new homes provided a distinguishing feature to an identity categorization that they did not necessarily align or choose, but was assigned to them by the international community. Liisa Malkki also discusses how identities are shaped in camps (Malkki 1992, 24-44).

Most of the research on vulnerability, marginalization, and housing is conducted through field work in the Global South. The reason for this is because the majority of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are housed within the Global South. It is through this gap in the literature that this paper has been constructed, and it has incorporated various fields of research within this new framing. It is imperative that these contemporary forms of refugee housing continue to be highlighted.

4. Camps

1. Traditional Camps

Camps have been around since before the creation of written history and have been used during times of conflict and migration. Historically, camps have also been used for punishment and confinement (Møller 2015, 1-11). Camps for punishment and confinement are occasionally set up in extraterritorial locations. Examples include

Guantanamo Bay, the Gulag camps, and Robben Island. Camps for confinement, punishment, torture, etc. may be patrolled/structured through private organizations. This is often done when trying to avoid state involvement and responsibility. No matter how camps are structured, located, or operated, they are structured to keep certain people in, and other groups out. The people housed are deemed as less than human. Part of their personal identity is stripped away. Stripping away a key component of someone's identity is what provides justification for the treatment of these people. The most common example is seen through a prison. The state is justified (or some claim) in its treatment of these people because they have been convicted of a crime. Therefore, they are not full citizens. By separating these individuals from the rest of society, the state contains them, ensuring no harm is inflicted on any citizen. This dehumanizing process of separating these individuals from the rest of society is what is known as "encampment."

In regard to refugee housing, the shift from asylum-oriented policies to containment occurred after WWII. Containment is most visibly expressed through the camps seen around the world. Marfleet discusses the recent shift to urban refugees. "Urban Refugees" is a recent phrase and label used to describe the "urbanization of displacement and humanitarian action within broader global processes" (Landau 2014, 139). The categorization has witnessed an increase in people seeking refuge in urban areas, thereby living within these urban centers. Urban refugees have shifted away from

the traditional camp-based forms of settlement. They tend to be integrated into urban society through different means. According to statistics from UNHCR in 2016, 72% of the 15,669,322 refugees live outside of camps. UNHCR's Policy on Alternatives to Camps requires UNHCR to assist in allowing refugees the opportunities to settle in communities outside of camps (UNHCR 2016). In theory, alternatives to camps are supposed to provide refugees more freedom in exercising their rights. This should be translated into better capacity to integrate and become a part of society. It seems as though states are less willing to accept the responsibilities they have signed onto through the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees as the rates of forced displacement are drastically rising, and not decreasing.

Bjørn Møller's research on camps, refugees, and prisoners provides a history of the application of camps and encampment. Møller explicitly states that camps are "states and places of exception." This links Agamben's theory of camps, encampment and bare life, as well as Foucault's concept of "heterotopias" (Møller 2015, 5-8). Heterotopias are "other places," places of segregation because they belong to a group of "others." Here, special rules apply.¹⁵ Refugee camps are viewed as heterotopias because of the exact conditions, process of segregation and separate policies in regard to where and how to house/host refugees. Other examples of heterotopias include airports, boats, and private property. Some have argued that the EU Schengen Zone and Dublin

¹⁵ For a full definition of heterotopia, see Møller 2015, 5.

Agreements are heterotopias because they are constructed to keep certain people out (Møller, 2015, 5-8) and special rules apply dictating how to enter this region.¹⁶

A clear example of how refugees are quarantined from certain populations is seen through examining the Dublin Regulations of the European Union. Peripheral states tend to carry the burden of receiving and process refugees. Asylum-seekers are literally confined to the outside of the European Union as they wait for their refugee status determination, thereby containing them from the rest of the European populations. The increased presence of detention centers in Europe also shows how encampment is confined to Western States as a way to limit the movement of refugees into the general populations (Agier 2010, 35-36). These detention centers act as outlets for the administration to “police” the undesirables. These centers dictate which undesirable will be accepted into the country, further portraying the link between identity and encampment. Furthermore, these detention centers are often privatized and run through private companies, rather than the government. This is strategic in order to avoid the government’s direct involvement in the poor treatment of human beings. The sorting offices that are located throughout Europe, mostly on the periphery of the Western European states, act as blockades restricting the movement into other parts of the continent (Agier 2010, 36).

¹⁶ For a more in-depth understanding of the differences between camps and encampment, see Peim 2016.

The spatial segregation that refugees are subjected to is implemented strategically to control the movement and activity of refugees. Host governments may use the national security rhetoric to classify refugees as dangerous. As illustrated, by using this rhetoric, the state is justified in placing refugees and asylum-seekers in spatially-segregated areas of cities. The measures a state may undertake to protect themselves from national security risks seem to justify the actions that would be considered unacceptable to people with complete citizenship and membership. However, refugees lack this social citizenship and membership, thereby making these exclusionary policies justified.

There is also an inherent political motive to confining refugees to specific places. By spatially confining refugees, the flow of information and exchange of ideas are less likely to occur (Kibreab 2007, 33). Governments may worry about radicalization, an argument that is explicitly clear in the rhetoric of the current Trump Administration. The state may also fear a social and cultural imbalance if refugees are allowed to integrate and live within urban areas of society. As Peim states, “the presence of the refugee disturbs the meaning of home” (Peim 2016, 187), where a refugee clearly symbolizes that they are estranged, and that the hosting community will also be estranged. By relocated refugees to the periphery, governments are able to “keep their cultural purity’ intact” (Kibreab 2007, 33). It is this lack of symbiotic exchange that makes spatial segregation a two-way encampment.

Camps themselves are stateless places. They are zones where the “jurisdictions, territories, and societies” are not always applicable or clearly defined. Furthermore, as cities develop and become increasingly urban, a general geographic sprawl tends to occur. However, the spaces that have been constructed for camps, or camp-like situations, will still maintain the “camp form,” perpetually “othering” those who occupy that space. These ordinary urban areas “reinforce the impression of a generalized apartheid,” creating “the encampment of the world” (Agier 2016, 465). Agier powerfully states,

“The history of camps and encampment can therefore be rewritten not only as that of the banishment and the invisibility of undesirables but also a presence and agency in a ‘global’ world that is still in search for the loci of politics beyond the existing national and urban frameworks” (Agier 2016, 466).

This statement sums up the connection between biopower, marginalization and encampment.

Camps have visibly established an inferior group, creating an “other.” Through this “other,” individuals are cut off from the public, and the public is cut off from the camp inhabitants. Agier points out the hypocrisy of camps, stating that camps which are constructed to exclude inhabitants from the rest of society also exclude the rest of society from these camps. This two-way confinement is what makes refugees hyper-invisible to society. Camps must work in mutual relationship with its inhabitants and greater society.

Camps are not created as ways to segregate. Rather, they are created due to the *need* to segregate and the need to control power, space, and movement (Malkki 2002, 355). Overall, the nature of the need to confine is built into the system. These policies of exception are not implemented solely by the state. Local communities further perpetuate these marginalized policies, as the city has certain expectations of the type of citizenship (Malkki 2002, 355). As Arendt claims, refugees are often viewed as individuals without this citizenship, thereby subjugating them to the city and state structure of exclusion/confinement.

Within the traditional forms of refugee camps (those typically seen in the Global South), UNHCR becomes in charge of biopolitics. UNHCR can decide who has the right to assistance, and how much assistance. Charles Lee introduces a new term, called the “third space of citizenship,” which speaks to this interconnection between bare life and biopolitical control (Lee 2010, 57-59).¹⁷ International organizations must also be held accountable for their involvement in this system and structure because they are partially responsible for the identity politics and marginalization of refugees, and benefit from these structures.

Barbara Harrell-Bond claims that the reason it took so long for UNHCR to publish a new refugee policy was because the organization was being supported and funded by the incarceration of refugees (Harrell-Bond 2015, xiv). The shift for UNHCR

¹⁷ Other researchers have expanded this categorization to the abject citizenship (see Brun, Fábos and El-Abed 2017, Butler 1993, Kristeva 1982, Tyler 2013, Sharkey and Shields 2008).

to acknowledge refugees in urban communities is rooted in a desire for improved integration, education, employment, etc. for refugees. Additionally, theoretically urban refugees have a better chance of integration, the third durable solution. Despite this shift in the location of refugees, most of the funding, attention, and assistance is still earmarked for rural refugees and traditional camp-based houses/assistance. The result is the creation of an invisible class of refugees, the urban refugees. Urban refugees' existence is increasingly denied by governments, which has both positive and negative implications (Marfleet 2007, 36).

Refugee camps are places where political, cultural and national identities are reconstructed. Barbara Harrell-Bond claims that the identification of *refugee* provides a space for administrative categorization (Harrell-Bond 2015, xi-xvi). This categorization validates states and the international community's creation of categories for identities. Camps represent areas where the "deprivation of liberty" occurs, spaces of exclusion and exception. The continual banalization and perpetuation/perception of camps as the solution has created a space where politicians—and public policy, in general—can "successfully" deal with undesirables (Agier 2016, 463-464). Camps are "sites of lasting 'biopolitics'" (Agier 2016, 460).

II. Island Encampment

Natasha Saunders highlights the existence of a paradigm shift within the refugee institutions and asylum policies. This shift has allowed for the creation and the

normalization of burden-sharing and extraterritorial processing zones. Refugees have begun to burden societies because of the ineffective means of solving refugee crises (Saunders 2014). Saunders highlights the need to reexamine the traditional understanding of the refugee regime as “humanitarian” (Saunders 2014). Rather than blatantly admitting that states do not want to deal with refugees and asylum-seekers, governments have begun to shift the burden.¹⁸ They have created extraterritorial zones, where refugees can be housed, vetted, and processed. Lammers has stated that forced migration is first and foremost a political issue; it is not a humanitarian issue (Lammers 2007, 100). It is the lack of acknowledging this underlying hidden language that has created spaces for these contemporary forms of encampment.

By referring to housing asylum-seekers on islands, which is demonstrated in the Government of Australia’s actions, this paper urges its readers to understand the implications of housing refugees and asylum-seekers in extraterritorial areas that can further marginalization and discrimination. The Australian Government has extraterritorial contracts with multiple small island states used specifically to house and encamp refugees. One of the most recent examples includes the detention centers found on the islands of Nauru and Manus. *The Guardian* first broke a story in 2016 about the Australian Government using offshore detention camps in Nauru and Manus as

¹⁸ U.S. President Donald Trump is the one exception to this norm. Trump has blatantly stated that he does not want to host refugees, applying the national security discourse. He even included refugees in his Muslim Ban Executive Order.

“immigration centers” for asylum-seekers in. The “Nauru Files” created controversy over how the Australian Government has been treating asylum-seekers. The Australian Government had a contract with the governments of Nauru and Manus that created an extraterritorial space where the Australian Government could “house” refugees.

These “immigration centers” in Nauru and Manus are similar to detention center and labor camps. Journalists have been forbidden to enter these camps, so the exact long-term abuses and the treatment of refugees there is unknown. Other offshore locations have included Christmas Island, where Australia is known to have further victimized refugees. In December 2016, the *New York Times* published an Opinion piece which reaffirmed that over 900 asylum-seekers are still being “housed” on these islands (Cohen 2016). The examples of Nauru and Manus clearly portray how extraterritorial housing is being played out in today’s refugee resettlement efforts.

These extraterritorial zones are constructed through the national security discourse. In reality, though, these zones are used to limit the number of refugees into the state, prioritizing which refugees need assistance. As Amnesty International said in a press statement released in August 2016,

“We must not forget that the [Australian] Government set up a system of deliberate abuse of and cruelty towards almost two thousand people in two detention centres who are simply looking for a safe place to rebuild their lives... It is high time the people currently trapped on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and on Nauru to be immediately brought to Australia to assess their refugee claims and live in the community. The Australian Government must be held accountable for the many years of

harm it has inflicted upon people seeking its protection, as well as shoulder its share of responsibility and treat people seeking asylum fairly” (Amnesty International 2016a).

This statement speaks to how a government is able to control the migration of certain people into the country by restricting access to the protection granted to them through international humanitarian law. Furthermore, the Australian Government uses offshore processing as a way to respond to (or ignore) the needs of asylum-seekers arriving in boats in need of protection (Amnesty International 2016a). The government of Australia has claimed that these offshore processing zones were implemented in order to prevent human smuggling (Smith 2016). They also claim that the offshore processing zones are used as ways to deter refugees and asylum-seekers from arriving in Australia by boat, thereby saving them from the “dangerous journey.” But as a representative from the Human Rights Law Centre has stated, “If this was really about safety, then the government would focus on developing safe and orderly paths to protection for people seeking asylum instead of needlessly punishing them” (Smith 2016).

This offshore processing zones are clear examples of the extent to which biopolitics, national security discourses, and housing can be interlinked in order to marginalize certain people. Prioritizing certain refugees over others is unfair in the wider range of human rights. Furthermore, housing some refugees on islands as a process of encampment is a violation of fundamental rights.

III. Ocean Gala

In order to deal with the large influx of those displaced as a result of the Syrian conflict, the Swedish Migration Agency contracted hotels and bought out other housing locations in order to solve the sudden and drastic need to house thousands of people (Svensson, O. 2016). While party to the Dublin Conventions, Sweden and other member states of the European Union temporarily suspended the policies mandating the return of all asylum-seekers to the first European country of arrival in (in most instances, Greece). This resulted in a drastic increase of asylum-seekers in Sweden and other European countries, who not only needed a place to stay, but also needed access to local courts to determine if they had valid claims for asylum.¹⁹

As a way to find a housing solution for this dramatic influx of people, in December 2015, the Swedish Migration Agency signed a contract with Floating Accommodations Sweden to obtain the services of Ocean Gala. Through this contract, a Caribbean cruise ship was scheduled to arrive in Swedish waters and house close to 1,800 refugees (Mårtensson 2016). It was later decided that the ship would dock at the port of Utansjö, outside of Härnösand in northern Sweden. Utansjö has 207 inhabitants (2010) and Härnösand has 1,644 inhabitants (2015) (Swedish Statistical Bureau, 2016), making the population sizes of both these places relatively small.²⁰ Ocean Gala was

¹⁹ Some EU states that suspended the Dublin Agreements also enacted a policy that removed the need process each individual case for asylum. Rather, a blanket group based refugee claim was given to people who have Syrian nationality, called *prima facie* status.

²⁰ It is unclear whether or not the selection of these northern cities has anything to do with the “Whole-Sweden” initiative, which advocated for more placement of refugees in the northern, more rural parts of Sweden (Valenta and Bunar 2010).

scheduled to accommodate a refugee population that would have been larger than the size of the two towns combined.

The people of Utansjö and Härnösand opposed the placement of Ocean Gala. They had not been incorporated into the talks, a violation of their municipal rights and local agreement with the Migration Agency (Sellen 2016). The residents felt as though the town was too small to accommodate a floatel. The inhabitants of these small towns cited the small populations of these two towns as the reasons why they did not feel they could successfully respond to the needs of these refugees (Thelberg and Jernberg 2016). When one community member was asked how he thought this plan would end, he replied “Catastrophe” (Mårtensson 2016). The local municipality had been trying to stop the ship from docking in Utansjö since they found out about the arrangement. Everyone in the community was reluctant to receive and integrate this many refugees at once. In general, there was a sense of wanting to help refugees and integrate them within society.²¹ However, not in this way. This case study exemplifies the lack of communication between the government agency, the private agency and the inhabitants.

To further complicate matters, the ship was docked at a privately-owned dock. Floating Accommodations Sweden argued that they did not need the permission and permits from the community and municipality to dock at a privately-owned dock and

²¹ As in most society, the Swedish population is not homogenous, and not everyone has the same feelings on refugees. Some claim that refugees are a drain on society, and that they do not attempt to integration with the Swedish citizens. However, the integration claim is still relevant to the housing policies, as it may be hard for the refugees to integrate if they are only allowed certain housing forms, and locations.

begin their mandate of housing refugees (Mårtensson 2016). The people of Härnösand felt as though a more permanent, integrated, form of housing needed to be investigated because forced global migration is not likely to be resolved within the next few years (Sellen 2016). This leads back to the original question of why this housing form? How is this an example of overall marginalization of refugees through housing policies and accommodation types?

Despite signing the contract, relocating the ship, and docking it in the port of Utansjö, the Swedish Migration Agency decided to back out of the contract after it had gone into effect. The Migration Agency claims they canceled the contract due to the financial cost it would have had on the Swedish economy after the Agency received a bill for 800,000 kronor a day (approximately 95,000 USD) (TT News, 2016). Floating Accommodation Sweden decided to sue the Migration Agency (TT News, 2016) for going back on their contract. The director of the Swedish Migration Agency recently resigned and the agency still refuses to talk in depth about Ocean Gala.²²

The exact reason why the people of Utansjö did not want to host these refugees can be further debated. The news reports claimed the reason was due to the lack of capacity to respond to up to 1,800 refugees within the small town. One must ask if there are any underlying reasons to this reluctance. Similar to the arguments made about the

²² The exact events leading up to the resignation of the head of the Swedish Migration Agency and the lawsuit with Floating Accommodation Sweden over the Ocean Gala contract, are not within the scope of this paper. There is also speculation that the Director resigned due to the Ocean Gala debacle.

state's ability to further discriminate against refugees based on housing policies, it is possible the residents of Utansjö are claiming an inability to integrate asylum-seekers.

i. Floatels- Contemporary encampment

Housing individuals on ships creates a physical space outside the usual territorial boundaries of the state. A boat or ship carrying the flag of a nation is still considered within the territory of that state. This territorial expansion further complicates the nature of this form of housing. The state is literally increasing their territorial borders through the ship. While the borders are extended, housing people on a ship still provides a space for extraterritorial control and spaces of exception where people are not within the state, but are not outside the state. As Agamben states, "One of the essential characteristics of modern biopolitics... is its constant need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside" (Agamben 1998). Not only does this threshold need to be redefined constantly, this form of housing creates a physical separation of what is inside and outside, thereby redefining it by default.

Privatizing housing removes the Swedish Migration Agency from the direct responsibility, thereby removing the state's responsibility.²³ However, it also provides

²³ Recently, there has been an increase in the move to privatize certain aspects of the Swedish economy, which has traditionally been welfare-oriented and state controlled. In 2010, the state owned pharmaceutical company was sold, and now allows for private interest groups to operate pharmacies. Privatizing refugee accommodations is a new wave in the privatizing.

sufficient evidence to support the claim that capitalism is inherent in the discussion of biopower. Not only does UNHCR profit off the camp-like housing the Global South (as Harrell-Bond claims above), but private corporations like Floating Accommodations Sweden profit from encamping refugees. The Migration Agency is subjugating and controlling the bodies and places of refugees and asylum-seekers. Human life is being controlled by another power and authority. As Foucault states when introducing the concept of biopower, “the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life [was able to introduce] diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations...” (Foucault 1990, 140). This shows how the creation a special space of territorial control is exerted through profiting from the classification of an individual.

By identifying these individuals as refugees and asylum-seekers, the state can control their bodies and placement of their bodies. The state can also decide which forms of housing are available to these individuals. As refugees and asylum-seekers are not seen as full citizens, this form of structural violence is not stopped. This is where the intersection of identity politics and these discriminatory housing politics are evident. As Agamben states, “the subjects caught within the camp are ‘so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that no act committed against them could appear any longer as a crime’” (Agamben in Lee 2010, 60). The Swedish state and Migration Agency are indisputably controlling refugees and asylum-seekers (and their bodies) through dictating where and how they are going to live.

In 2014, the Canadian government housed refugees in hotels, as a response to their housing shortage. Carrie Dawson argues that the Canadian Government was attempting to make refugees increasingly invisible by highlighting how hospitable the state was by taking them in. Jason Kenney, former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in Canada, stated that asylum-seekers were being housed in 3-star hotels and other “hotel-like” conditions. Former Minister Kenney used this form of housing as justification for housing due to the hospitality of the state, thereby normalizing the detention-like housing standards. However, this appeal qualifies as “vernacular violence” a phrase coined by Pugliese (Dawson 2014). Vernacular violence is

“violence that is disguised by an appeal to ordinariness – to argue that the policies and discourses that relegate the refugee to a civilian space (the hotel room), normalize their suffering by situating that suffering “within the unexceptional spaces and sites of everyday civilian life” (Pugliese cited in Dawson 2014, 834).

The concept of vernacular violence is also relevant to floatels, as former Minister Kenney’s statement on hotels and refugee accommodations could easily be expanded to living on a cruise ship. Living on a cruise ship is not the same as going on a cruise, just as living in a hotel is not the same thing as vacationing in a luxury hotel. Rather than luxury cruise ships or fancy hotel rooms, the way these forms of refugee housing are constructed are more akin to detention centers. They are places where undesirables must stay and be watched. These “houses” are places where the local citizens do not belong, and should not enter.

Scott's main thesis is to direct attention to how states can manipulate individuals after identification is assigned to them that makes them legitimate within the structure (Scott 1998). When relating this concept to the larger picture of classifying refugees and asylum-seekers, it is clear that states and institutions are able to allow for structural violence against refugees to persist. It is also increasingly clear how states can manipulate the placement and treatment of refugees through the classification and distinctions assigned to them as refugees and asylum-seekers. As Malkki stated, displacement threatens the "national order of things" (quoted Brun, Fábos and El-Abed 2017, 3), where a state can legitimately include or exclude certain individuals based on their original displacement (Brun, Fábos and El-Abed 2017, 3).

ii. Future Concerns

If refugees had been housed on this cruise ship, one can only hypothesize how the people of Utansjö and Härnösand might have responded to them. Any tension that could have existed would likely have stemmed from a lack of acceptance to this form of housing and hospitality by the local population. Furthermore, the lack of asking the refugees and asylum-seekers how they felt about this housing strategy, perpetuates their lack agency and the perspective that they need someone to take complete care of them.

Integration into the communities would have been nearly impossible. While a working permit is needed to work, even if asylum-seekers had the required permits, finding employment would have been challenging. There is not enough capacity to

effectively house and integrate almost 1,800 refugees in a town with 200+ people. Furthermore, learning Swedish could have been challenging due to the small village size. Language and education are imperative to integrate refugees and asylum-seekers, especially children. There would have been additional “strain” on the community to educate any children, and to incorporate them into the school system, despite potential language and cultural barriers, as well as different educational levels. There have also been reports of increased tuberculosis outbreaks as a result of infection in unaccompanied refugee children (Olmås 2016). There are also concerns over how an outbreak on the ship would be dealt with. The worry is that the ship would have become a detention center for those who are sick, becoming a hotbed for contamination.

As the number of asylum-seekers in Sweden have gone up, so too have the accounts of violence towards these asylum-seekers. There are often media reports of asylum accommodation homes being lit on fire, or fights breaking out (Londoño 2015; TT 2016; and many more). There has also been a recent report of unaccompanied refugee children being forced into the sex industry (Svensson, F. 2016). Questions about the security of refugees are exceptionally important to address when discussing Ocean Gala. What would happen if the cruise ship was lit on fire? Would there be a plan for the same types of security patrolling the cruise ship as have been implemented in other housing accommodations throughout Sweden? What about a curfew: would one be imposed? What does this kind of policing perpetuate in terms of how refugees are

perceived when it comes to the discussion of refugees within a context of national security? It is also important to think about human security, and the violence against one another, especially violence against women, that could be present on these ships.

There is a need to address the psychological security of refugees and asylum-seekers. As Hansson MalmLöf identified, the common practice of grouping all refugees and asylum-seekers together under a national security discourse not only allows for people to assume all refugees are threats, but it also has implications on the refugees and asylum-seekers themselves that is not often discussed. These refugees and asylum-seekers may have increased anxiety and fear as the people around them are automatically categorizing them as threats and “others” (Hansson MalmLöf 2016, 1). The psychological security and fear also needs to be evaluated when considering these types of housing in the future. While someone’s physical features might not indicate that they are a refugee or asylum-seeker, living on a cruise ship would physically separate these individuals from the rest of society, as well as visibly identifying this categorical classification. This speaks to the quote from Zetter on page 29.

These exact questions are impossible to answer and analyze given that Ocean Gala never housed refugees. However, these questions lead back to the concept of encampment. These concerns vividly portray how this floating accommodation is a contemporary form of encampment for refugees and asylum-seekers, and a planned subjugation of people’s bodies and worth by the state. It is through the process of marginalization and the “othering” of refugees within the context of Sweden that the

government was able to push for this policy and housing, and the Migration Agency was able to sign a contract with Floating Accommodations Sweden.

6. What does this mean? Where to go from here?

The two types of housing that this paper examines are different in nature. One could be considered “open housing” (Sweden) while the other “closed” (Naurus). The reason for choosing these two types of encampment is to show that while the open housing still gives a feeling of fluidity and freedom, due to the policies around the open housing, neither model actually allows for this freedom. Rather, these models provide a false sense of integration and freedom, for both onlookers and refugees. It is this false sense of freedom and choice that is interpreted as a form of encampment.

The example of Australia’s treatment of refugees arriving on boats further complicates the Swedish floatel case. Boats tend to be used for shipping, containment, and movement, and can be shipped off elsewhere. Due to the temporary aspect of boats, floatels could easily be moved. There is fear that these boats would never have to be tied to a specific location, as by nature a ship lacks a permanent place to dock. What would this mean to the people living on the ship? If permits were revoked and the ship was forced to leave, what would happen to the people? Would alternative forms of housing be investigated in those cases? Where is the security and solution within this

type of housing? These floatels must not turn into extraterritorial processing zones that are seen in the examples of island encampment.

While the floatel example may not be viewed as extreme as the confinement of refugees on offshore islands, it is the overall treatment and marginalization of refugees and asylum-seekers that seriously needs to be addressed. Refugees and asylum-seekers should not be further marginalized through these housing processes, as they are already marginalized through their classification. As Agamben stated in introducing his concept of state of exception and bare life, “Along with the emergence of biopolitics, we can observe a displacement and gradual expansion beyond the limits of the decision on bare life, in the state of exception, in which sovereignty consisted” (Agamben 1998). This expansion of sovereignty is seen in how states are housing and treating refugees and asylum-seekers.

Malkki notes that refugees are often contained in camps due to their statelessness; camps are also used to regulate and normalize certain behavior (Møller 2015, 87). While this statement, and most of the research on refugee identity and marginalization through encampment, has been related to traditional camp-based settlements, this paper argues that the same form of marginalization and relocation exists in contemporary refugee housing solutions but is invisible. The same mechanisms of creating zones of exception and spatialized segregation within communities are still

being employed, however more discretely. In fact, housing refugees in camps has become so normalized, that societies no longer need to justify their actions in doing so.

If refugees could self-settle among the host populations, their identification and hyper-visibility would shift. They would adapt more easily into the local communities and become undetectable as outsiders within societies (Kibreab 2007, 33). Egypt, for example does not assist or locate urban refugees within Cairo. Housing and integration are the responsibility of the individual. This lack of state involvement could have been an alternate approach. This could have avoided housing refugees and asylum-seekers on the floatel. However, not using this approach is due in large part to the existing structure within Sweden that did not allow for this approach to housing refugees to be investigated. The larger question is why not? What about the European situation on refugees is different from the Global South approach? How is national security (and the fear of terrorism) used to house certain groups of people in specific peripheral places?

It is the hyper-visibility and categorization of refugees that has allowed for refugees to be increasingly marginalized. This marginalization creates a space for refugees to become invisible through the spatial-segregation of their housing. The United Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has begun to provide legal norms in reference to housing regulations for returning refugees and asylum-seekers (Thiele 2000; Anderson 2011). There is a need for the creation of an international standard for housing for refugees and asylum-seekers, beyond the

requirements for “adequate” housing. It is equally imperative that these standards are implemented and states are held accountable for their actions and human rights violations.

There is a need to ask why refugees? when examining this type of housing. Yes, there was/is a housing shortage in Sweden. Yes, there was/is a large number of refugees entering Sweden rapidly, and the state was not as equipped to dealing with this influx of people. But through a crisis narrative driven national security threat, the state was able to investigate floatels to house refugees. Why did Sweden not investigate and employ the same tactics as Canada, who houses refugees within families. Or, why did Sweden not investigate the Egyptian approach, mentioned above. Why were/are refugees the target population to house on floatels? Why not make floatels student housing and house refugees within the cities? There is something larger to how refugees are perceived within society, as victims in need of saving, but still not full members of society. As non-complete members of society, the state can still marginalize their identities. This allows for refugees to be the population of concern and the population able to be housed on floatels. It is this identity discourse that works with the national security discourse and biopower that allows for state marginalization. While the floatel case is not a housing policy in the same way as permanent housing policies, the temporary approach to accommodation shows how undesirable and indispensable refugees and asylum-seekers are.

7. Conclusion

Catherina Brun states, “Houses may be turned into homes by their residents, but some houses will never feel like home—never become home” (Brun 2015, 44). This illustrates that the concept of refugee and housing policies in regard to forced displacement may be (potentially) contradictory in nature. For many refugees and asylum-seekers, their home is in their country of origin, and while they may be hosted in other countries, these houses are not home in the meaning of the word. There is also a difference between making home, and homemaking (Brun and Fábos 2015, 5). These perspectives of home, homemaking, and habitation are all exceptionally important concepts that need to be included within the framing of housing policies related to refugees and asylum-seekers. Is the accommodation going to allow for the feeling of home, or will it further marginalize and victimize the refugees? If it will not allow for a sense of place and belonging, I argue that it should be considered a form of encampment as it limits the interactions from all sides of the community.

In the research conducted by Jef Huysmans on the securitization of migration within the European Union, Huysmans discusses how migrants and asylum-seekers are portrayed as national security risks and challenge the existing “protection of national identity” (Huysmans 2000, 751). By portraying migration and asylum-seekers within the national security discourse, the European Union has permitted states to implement certain policies that marginalize the reception and perception of refugees and asylum-

seekers. Examples within the most recent European forced migration include Sweden's tightening of family reunification policies, Sweden implementing passport control at the borders, Hungary closing its borders and refusing to allow refugees to enter, or Finland closing part of the border between Russia. Western European states have allowed for the politics of belonging to become embedded within the securitization discourse, effectively informing people when they do not belong (Huysmans 2000, 752-771).

By framing refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants through the security discourse, the concept of the right to all rights becomes void (Huysmans 2000; Loescher and Milner 2005; Kibreab 2007). Identifying someone as a refugee allows the state to justify certain actions that would not be tolerable if these individuals were categorized as full citizens (Loescher and Milner 2005, 32-34).²⁴ This dichotomy was addressed in Section 4 when discussing how identity, security discourse and marginalization. It is a visible description of biopower being used by the state.

Netto discusses the openly racialized approaches that European governments employ to discriminate against refugees and their housing. In certain places asylum-seekers have no say in where they will reside (Netto 2011, 286). This allows for certain pockets of the city to become earmarked as places that can accept refugees, and other

²⁴ For a more in-depth understanding of current research and researchers who have contributed to the field of securitization and marginalization of refugees through a "national security discourse," see: Aiken 2001; Fábos and Kibreab 2007, Huysmans 2000, Kibreab 2007, Loescher and Milner 2005, Saunders 2014, Hyndman 2000, Hansson Malmlöf 2016, Zetter 1991, and many more.

areas of cities as places where refugees are not welcome. Hirschler, through his field work in the UK found that the experiences refugees were facing, and that Agamben's framework of bare life (in regard to refugees) was accurate in practice and therefore no longer just a theoretical framework (Hirschler 2015, 210-218). Refugees are increasingly placed in states of exceptions, where they are just seen as bodies in need of saving. There are other examples in which refugees and asylum-seekers are excluded from different forms of housing. Zetter and Pearl (1999) discuss how policy restrictions have made asylum-seekers ineligible to access certain social housing in the United Kingdom. Another example is seen in the treatment of unaccompanied minors arriving in the UK, where they are put in detention centers, a clear example of the state of exception (Peim 2016, 192).

Much of the literature on legibility, classification, and state policies build off James Scott's *Seeing like a State*. As the subtitle of the book suggests, Scott analyzes how "certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed" due to the lack of recognizing and incorporating local knowledge in the schemes. These schemes perpetuate the structural violence that has allowed for discrimination to persist. Scott's argument addresses "high-modernist" societies, and how these states govern through the social and natural world to create a more effective, productive society (Scott 1998). Elizabeth Cullen Dunn asserts that the state is not only able to turn concepts into reality (Dunn 2008, 244-246), but the state is also able to dictate which concept and design will

be implemented to do so. For Scott, there are three processes needed in order for the state to achieve its laws and policies. The first process is simplification, the second is legibility, and the third is manipulation (Scott 1998). While the required processes are originally applied to the entire state structure, they can be extended to our understanding of refugees, and their contemporary marginalization.

Dunn further states that while some criticize Scott's perspective on the state and its involvement in all aspects of society, the "boundary between "state" and "society" is analytically nonexistent (Dunn 2008, 245). Places that seem to be free from state control are, in fact, still under the control of the state because the state has decided not to control these spaces (Dunn 2008, 245). This statement speaks to the concept of biopower by highlighting how the state has control through all aspects of society, whether we want to acknowledge its presence or not. While some may see Ocean Gala as a response to the lack of housing, the state controls all aspects of society, making Ocean Gala a response to everything within the state's control. Furthermore, this perspective is relevant when discussing privatization of essential goods and services as the state still has some control over the private sphere, deciding what/when to privatize. As Ocean Gala was run through a private company, the state is still responsible and controls the housing as they selected the bid and parties responsible.

Discrimination against refugees and asylum-seekers is not unique to Sweden.²⁵ It is also not unique to Western states. However, it is the subtle forms of discrimination that have allowed for individuals to be placed into “other,” non-citizen categories, that this paper sought to illuminate. If the Swedish state proposed housing Swedes on Ocean Gala due to the same housing crisis, there would have been a very different response to the current one on refugees and asylum-seekers. It is solely because these refugees and asylum-seekers are not Swedes, and therefore not complete citizens, that this is offered as a housing solution. Because these refugees and asylum-seekers are seen as not needing to fit into society, the state allows for forms of marginalization to be employed on their bodies. This marginalization will spatially segregate them from the rest of society.

It is understandable that Sweden was forced to take drastic measures to address a housing crisis quickly. I empathize with how overwhelmed, overworked and overburdened the Swedish Migration Agency must have been during the refugee crisis in Sweden. Naturally, the Swedish government had to respond to the needs to asylum-

²⁵ In an extreme example, after only nine days in office, the President of the United States Donald Trump signed an executive order that blocked entrance of people that held nationalities from Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and Somalia into the United States. The consequences of this Executive Action were chaotic, as hundreds of people, refugees, green card holders, citizens, were refused entry into the U.S., deported, or not allowed to leave from their point of departure. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit against the government in New York. Federal Judges in New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, Washington, granted stays to individuals that already had the right to be here. However, as of ####, the stay does not apply to future refugees, who have only been barred from entering the country for 120 days (Markon, Brown and Shaver 2017).

seekers while still responding to the taxpayers that fund the refugee resettlement. The biggest critique I make with the Sweden case is that it is a form of housing that further marginalizes and discriminates against the refugees and asylum-seekers. The fear is that this housing would not be short-term, as is evident by the example in Copenhagen during the Bosnian conflict.

The goal of this paper was to show one particular way in which camps have become invisible to the common eye. The shift towards urban refugees has not halted the presence of camps. It is not until we can begin to acknowledge that housing policies create camp-like living, that we can begin to deconstruct the system that has allowed for these forms of encampment to exist. While the paper takes an unconventional approach to critiquing a housing form that has never been employed, it does so with purpose. It hopes to avoid future floatels as a way to house marginalize communities, whether it is refugees, racial minorities, children, women, etc. It is preemptively written to avoid future crisis narratives.

While these housing policies may be invisible to the naked eye, we must begin to look at society with more critical eyes, especially when it comes to policies around already marginalized groups. What are the state's end goals? Who within the state is profiting? There is a tendency to think of the state as one autonomous unit, but it is not. There are conflicting power dynamics at play, with different goals within every aspect of the state. However, who is on top? How did they get there? What do they benefit

from these policies? The agency that refugees and asylum-seekers hold must be incorporated into the decisions on where to house refugees and how to integrate them.²⁶ Secondary and community-based activism can occur to improve the integration of refugees into society, and assist with the housing dilemma (Hirschler 2015, 211). The Hotham Mission's Asylum Seekers Project, for example, provides a model of support and reception, offering a viable alternative to the offshore immigration detention form seen in Australia (Mitchell and Kirsner 2004, 119). If more organizations and states approached immigration and integration of refugees and asylum-seekers from this perspective, there could be a fundamental paradigm shift in how we view refugees and asylum-seekers, and the process and success of integration. There needs to be more research conducted into what other forms of housing were overlooked. Has Sweden thought about housing refugees in a similar way that Canada does, in homes with the local people? What about the concept of refugees makes them and their bodies so disposable?

Some may dispute that this argument is too simplistic and combines the state into one autonomous unit, ignoring the conflicting people, ideas, and parties at play. While this is true, it does not delegitimize the states involvement in discriminating against a social group of people. This example is used to show that even the simplistic form of marginalization (housing people in temporary ships because the lack of housing

²⁶ It is difficult to get the perspective of refugees and asylum-seekers who would have been housed on Ocean Gala as the cruise ship never actually housed refugees.

elsewhere) discriminates against a group of people. Even though it was Hitler who ruled over Germany, implementing the Holocaust policies, the involvement and actions of other Nazi officials are not legitimate simply because they were not in charge. The Nuremburg trials proves that and created a standard of international law. Abusing and taking advantage of people and their ranking within society must be stopped. Refugees should not be seen as less-than-human and housed on floatels. The state is responsible for the well-being of *all* individuals in society, not just its citizens.

In summary, highlighting the intersection between securitization, identification, marginalization, and housing is becoming increasingly important. This paper has attempted to provide a concrete example where the national security discourse, identity, and marginalization has allowed for discriminatory housing policies to be employed on refugees and asylum-seekers. This paper began by providing a historical analysis of the concepts of identity and marginalization. It then discussed the historical contexts of camps, and the spatial segregation that camps have come to represent. By highlighting how states can employ their biopolitical power, this paper showed how states are able to exclude certain groups of people from the rest of society as these people are no longer seen as citizens. While different people might represent this “othered” group, this paper focused specifically on refugees and asylum-seekers. It is my hope that this paper puts pressure on the international community to investigate floatels as forms of encampment and stop utilizing it as special segregation to house refugees and asylum-seekers.

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